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Abstract
This paper studies secrecy transmission with the aid of a group of wireless energy harvesting (WEH)-enabled
amplify-and-forward (AF) relays performing cooperative jamming (CJ) and relaying. The source node in the network
does simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) with each relay employing a power splitting
(PS) receiver in the first phase; each relay further divides its harvested power for forwarding the received signal and
generating artificial noise (AN) for jamming the eavesdroppers in the second transmission phase. In the centralized
case with global channel state information (CSI), we provide closed-form expressions for the optimal and/or
suboptimal AF-relay beamforming vectors to maximize the achievable secrecy rate subject to individual power
constraints of the relays, using the technique of semidefinite relaxation (SDR), which is proved to be tight. A fully
distributed algorithm utilizing only local CSI at each relay is also proposed as a performance benchmark. Simulation
results validate the effectiveness of the proposed multi-AF relaying with CJ over other suboptimal designs.
Index Terms
Artificial noise, cooperative jamming, amplify-and-forward relaying, secrecy communication, semidefinite re-
laxation, wireless energy harvesting.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless powered communication network has arisen as a new system with stable and self-sustainable power sup-
plies in shaping future-generation wireless communications [1, 2]. The enabling technology, known as simultaneous
wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT), has particularly drawn an upsurge of interests owing to the far-
field electromagnetic power carried by radio-frequency (RF) signals that affluently exist in wireless communications.
With the transmit power, waveforms, and dimensions of resources, etc., being all fully controllable, SWIPT promises
to prolong the lifetime of wireless devices while delivering the essential communication functionality, as will be
important for low-power applications such as RF identification (RFID) and wireless sensor networks (WSNs) (see
[3, 4] and the references therein).
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2On the other hand, privacy and authentication have increasingly become major concerns for wireless communica-
tions and physical (PHY)-layer security has emerged as a new layer of defence to realize perfect secrecy transmission
in addition to the costly upper-layer techniques such as cryptography. In this regard, relay-assisted secure trans-
mission was proposed [5, 6] and PHY-layer security enhancements by means of cooperative communications have
since attracted much attention [7–20].
In particular, cooperative schemes can be mainly classified into three categories: decode-and-forward (DF),
amplify-and-forward (AF), and cooperative jamming (CJ) [7] with CJ being most relevant to PHY-layer security.
Specifically, coordinated CJ refers to the scheme of generating a common jamming signal across all single-antenna
relay helpers against eavesdropping [7, 10, 12, 13], while uncoordinated CJ considers that each relay helper emits
independent artificial noise (AN) to confound the eavesdroppers [15, 16]. It is expected that in the scenarios where
the direct link is broken between the transmitter (Tx) and the legitimate receiver (Rx), some of the relays have
to take on their conventional role of forwarding the information while others will perform CJ [17, 18]. A recent
paradigm that generalizes all the above-mentioned cooperation strategies is cooperative beamforming (CB) mixed
with CJ [19, 20], where the available power at each relay is split into two parts: one for forwarding the confidential
message and the other for CJ.
However, mixed CB-CJ approaches may be prohibitive in applications with low power devices because idle
relays with limited battery supplies would likely prefer saving power for their own traffic to assisting others’
communication. In light of this, SWIPT provides the incentive for potential helpers to perform dedicated CB mixed
with CJ at no expense of its own power, but opportunistically earn harvested energy. Motivated by this, our work
considers secrecy transmission from a Tx to a legitimate Rx with the aid of a set of single-antenna wireless energy
harvesting (WEH)-enabled AF-operated relays in the presence of multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers. As a matter
of fact, cooperative schemes that involve WEH-enabled relays was recently investigated in [21]. We consider the
use of the dynamic power splitting (DPS) receiver architecture, initially proposed for SWIPT in [22], which divides
the received power with an adjustable ratio for energy harvesting (EH) and information receiving (IR). WEH-
enabled relays using DPS receivers have also been considered in [23–25] and [26, 27, 29], without (w/o) and with
secrecy consideration, respectively. Note that there is also interest in addressing the threat that WEH receivers may
attempt to intercept the confidential messages in SWIPT-enabled networks [28–31]. Nevertheless, we will focus on
exploiting the benefits of WEH-enabled relays when they are trustful.
In particular, motivated by the strong interest in SWIPT and the vast degree-of-freedom (DoF) achievable by
cooperative relays, this paper aims to maximize the secrecy rate with the aid of WEH-enabled AF-operated relays,
3subject to the EH power constraints of individual relays by jointly optimizing the CB of the relays and the CJ
covariance matrix.1 In this paper, we assume that there is no direct link between the source and destination nodes,
and perfect global channel state information (CSI) is available for the case of centralized optimization.
It is worth pointing out that although our setting may look similar to [20], their optimal CB-CJ design is not
applicable to ours due to the multiplicative nature in beamforming weights incurred by the power splitting (PS)
ratios that intrinsically poses more intractability to our optimization problem. Further, our work also differs from
[27] where an efficient algorithm was proposed to maximize the secrecy rate for the optimization of the PS ratios
and AF relay beamforming. The difference is twofold. First, AN was not considered in the second transmission
phase in [27] and in addition, their algorithm only converged to a local optimum, as opposed to our work that gives
the global optimal solutions for CB.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes two types of WEH-enabled Rx architecture for
the AF relays and defines the secrecy rate region of the relay wiretap channel. Section III then formulates the secrecy
rate maximization problems that jointly optimize the AN (or CJ) and the AF-relay CB for the WEH-enabled relays
operating with the two types of Rx. The problems are respectively solved by centralized schemes in Section IV
and distributed approaches in Section V. Section VI provides simulation results to evaluate the performance of the
proposed schemes. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
Notations—We use the uppercase boldface letters for matrices and lowercase boldface letters for vectors. The
superscripts (·)T , (·)†, (·)H and (·)∗ represent, respectively, the transpose, conjugate, conjugate transpose operations
on vectors or matrices, and the optimum. In addition, trace(·) stands for the trace of a square matrix. Moreover,
[·]i,j denotes the (i, j)th entry of a matrix, while ‖ · ‖ and ‖ · ‖.2 represent the Euclidean norm and the entry-wise
absolute value square of a vector, respectively. Also, diag(·) denotes a diagonal matrix with its diagonal specified
by the given vector and [·]Ni=1 represents an N × 1 vector with each element indexed by i. Furthermore, · and ◦
stand for product and Hadamard product, respectively. C(R)x×y denotes the field of complex (real) matrices with
dimension x× y and E[·] indicates the expectation operation. Finally, (x)+ is short for max(0, x).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider secrecy transmission in a SWIPT-enabled WSN, where a Tx (Alice) wants to establish
confidential communication with the legitimate Rx (Bob) with no direct link but with the aid of N WEH-enabled
sensors operating as AF relays, denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , N}, in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers (Eves),
1The scenario is applicable to WSNs, e.g., a remote health system where a moving patient reports its physical data to a health centre with
the aid of intermediary sensor nodes installed on other patients in the vicinity.
4Fig. 1. The system model for an AF relay-assisted SWIPT WSN.
denoted by K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}, all equipped with single antenna. We assume that there is no direct link from the
Tx to any of the Eves,2 due to, for instance, severe path loss or shadowing, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
We consider a two-hop relaying protocol based on two equal time slots and the duration of one transmit-slot is
normalized to be one unit so that the terms “energy” and “power” are interchangeable with respect to (w.r.t.) one
transmit-slot.
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(a) WEH-enabled relay with SPS.
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(b) WEH-enabled relay with DPS.
Fig. 2. Architectures of the receiver for WEH-enabled relay.
At the receiver of each AF relay, we introduce two types of WEH-enabled receiver architecture, namely, static
power splitting (SPS) (Fig. 2(a)) and DPS (Fig. 2(b)), both of which allow the relay to harvest energy and receive
information from the same received signal. Specifically, the receiver first splits a portion of αi, of the received
power for EH and the rest 1 − αi for IR, ∀i. The αi portion of harvested power is further divided into two
streams with ηρiαi|yri |2 used for generating the AN to confound Eves and η(1 − ρi)αi|yri |2 used for amplifying
the received signal, where yri is the ith element of the received signal yr ∈ CN×1, and 0 ≤ η < 1 denotes the EH
efficiency. Note that DPS with adjustable αi’s is presently the most general receiver operation because practical
circuits cannot directly decode the information from the stream used for EH [22] and SPS is just a special case
2Note that if there exist direct links, our problem formulation and solutions are still applicable without much modification by incorporating
destination-aided AN in the first transmit-slot (see [27]).
5of DPS with αi = α¯i, ∀i, fixed for the whole transmission duration. However, SPS, advocated for its ease of
implementation, is introduced separately in the sequel for its simplified relay beamforming design.
In the first transmit-slot, the received signal at each individual relay can be expressed as
yri = hsri
√
Pss+ na,i, ∀i, (1)
where the transmit signal s is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) random variable with zero mean
and unit variance, denoted by s ∼ CN (0, 1), hsri denotes the complex channel from the Tx to the ith relay, Ps is
the transmit power at the Tx, and na,i is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) introduced by the receiving
antenna of the ith relay, denoted by na,i ∼ CN (0, σ2na). As such, the linearly amplified baseband equivalent signal
at the output of the ith relay is given by
xri1 = βi(
√
1− αiyri + nc,i), ∀i, (2)
where βi denotes the complex AF coefficient, and nc,i denotes the noise due to signal conversion from the RF
band to baseband, denoted by nc,i ∼ CN (0, σ2nc). Since xri1 is constrained by the portion of the harvested power
for forwarding, i.e., η(1 − ρi)αi|yri |2, βi is accordingly given by
βi =
√
η(1− ρi)αi|hsri |2Ps
(1− αi)|hsri |2Ps + (1− αi)σ2na + σ2nc
ej∡βi , (3)
where ∡βi denotes the phase of the AF coefficient for the ith relay.
Next, we introduce the CJ scheme. Denote the CJ signal generated from N relays by xr2 = [xr12, . . . , xrN2]T and
define its covariance matrix as S = E[xr2xHr2]. Then the coordinated CJ transmission can be uniquely determined
by the truncated eigenvalue decomposition (EVD) of S given by S = V˜ Σ˜V˜ H , where Σ = diag([σ1, . . . , σd]) is
a diagonal matrix with σj’s denoting all the positive eigenvalues of S and V ∈ CN×d is the precoding matrix
satisfying V HV = I. Note that d ≤ N denotes the rank of S which will be designed later. As a result, the CJ
signal can be expressed as
xr2 =
d∑
j=1
√
σjvjs
′
j, (4)
where vj’s are drawn from the columns of V , and s′j’s are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex
Gaussian variables denoted by s′j ∼ CN (0, 1), which is known as the optimal distribution for AN [12]. On the
other hand, |xri2|2 ≤ ηρiαi|yri |2, ∀i, denotes the power constraint for jamming at the ith relay, which implies that
trace(SEi) ≤ ηρiαiPs|hsri |2, ∀i, (5)
where Ei is a diagonal matrix with its diagonal ei (a unit vector with the ith entry equal to 1 and the rest equal
to 0).
6SINRS,D =
Ps|hTrdDβαhsr|2
trace(Sh†rdh
T
rd) + σ
2
na‖hTrdDβα‖2 + σ2nc‖hTrdDβ‖2 + σ2nd
(8)
SINRS,E,k =
Ps|hTre,kDβαhsr|2
trace(Sh†re,kh
T
re,k) + σ
2
na‖hTre,kDβα‖2 + σ2nc‖hTre,kDβ‖2 + σ2ne,k
(9)
Note that the CJ scheme proposed above is of the most general form. For the special case when d = 1, i.e.,
xr2 =
√
σ1v1s
′
1, each relay transmits a common jamming signal s′1 with their respective weight drawn from v1
[7, 13]. This case is desirable in practice since it has the lowest complexity for implementation. In summary, the
transmitted signal at the ith relay is given by
xri = xri1 + xri2, ∀i. (6)
According to (6) together with (1), (2), and (4), the transmit signal from all relays can be expressed in vector
form as
xr =Dβαhsr
√
Pss+Dβαna +Dβnc +
d∑
j=1
√
σjvjs
′
j, (7)
where Dβα and Dβ are, respectively, diagonal matrices with their diagonals composed of (β1
√
1− α1, . . . ,
βN
√
1− αN )T and (β1, . . . , βN )T . In addition, hsr = [hsri ]Ni=1, na = [na,i]Ni=1, and nc = [nc,i]Ni=1.
In the second transmit-slot, the received signal at the desired receiver, i.e., Bob, is given by
yd = h
T
rdxr + nd, (10)
where hrd = [hrid]Ni=1 comprises complex channels from the ith relay to the Rx and nd ∼ CN (0, σ2nd) is the
corresponding receiving AWGN. By substituting (7) into (10), yd can be expressed as
yd = h
T
rdDβαhsr
√
Pss+ h
T
rdDβαna + h
T
rdDβnc + h
T
rd
d∑
j=1
√
σjvjs
′
j + nd. (11)
The received signal at the kth Eve, k ∈ K, is given by
ye,k = h
T
re,kDβαhsr
√
Pss+ h
T
re,kDβαna + h
T
re,kDβnc + h
T
re,k
d∑
j=1
√
σjvjs
′
j + ne,k, (12)
where hre,k = [hrie,k]Ni=1 denotes the complex channels from the relays to the kth Eve and ne ∼ CN (0, σ2ne) is
the AWGN at the kth eavesdropper.
The mutual information for the Rx (Bob) is given by rS,D = 12 log2(1 + SINRS,D), and that for the kth Eve
is rS,E,k = 12 log2(1 + SINRS,E,k), ∀k, where SINRS,D and SINRS,E,k, which denote their respective signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratios (SINRs), are given at the top of next page.
7Next, we define the secrecy rate region that consists of all the achievable secrecy rate for the relay wiretap
channel given transmit power Ps, denoted by R({∡βi}, {ρi}, {αi},S), which is given by [7, 32]
R({∡βi}{ρi}, {αi},S) ,
⋃
{∡βi},{ρi},{αi},(5)
{
rsec : rsec ≤
(
rS,D −max
k∈K
rS,E,k
)+}
. (13)
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. AN-Aided Secrecy Relay Beamforming for SPS
In this section, we consider the secrecy rate maximization problem by jointly optimizing the AN beams, relay
beam and their power allocations for WEH-enabled AF relays operating with SPS, i.e., αi = α¯i, ∀i, is fixed.
By replacing βi with (3), |hTrdDβαhsr|2 in (8) at the next page becomes
|hTrdDβαhsr|2 =
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
w1,i[h˜sd]i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, (14)
where w1,i =
√
1− ρiej∡βi and
[h˜sd]i , hsrihrid
√
ηα¯i(1−α¯i)|hsri |
2Ps
(1−α¯i)(|hsri |
2Ps+σ2na )+σ
2
nc
. (15)
In addition, σ2na‖hTrdDβα‖2 and σ2nc‖hTrdDβ‖2 in (8) can also be combined as
σ2na‖hTrdDβα‖2 + σ2nc‖hTrdDβ‖2 =
N∑
i=1
|w1,i|2[Dsˆd]i,i, (16)
where
[Dsˆd]i,i =
ηα¯iPs|hsri |2|hrid|2((1 − α¯i)σ2na + σ2nc)
(1− α¯i)(|hsri |2Ps + σ2na) + σ2nc
. (17)
As a result, rS,D can be rewritten as
rS,D =
1
2
log2
(
1 + Ps|h˜
T
sdw1|
2
trace(Sh†rdh
T
rd)+w
H
1 Dsˆdw1+σ
2
nd
)
, (18)
where w1 = [w1,i]Ni=1. Similarly by letting
[h˜se,k]i , hsrihrie,k
√
ηα¯i(1− α¯i)|hsri |2Ps
(1− α¯i)(|hsri |2Ps + σ2na) + σ2nc
(19)
and
[Dsˆe,k]i,i ,
ηα¯iPs|hsri |2|hrie,k|2((1 − α¯i)σ2na + σ2nc)
(1− α¯i)(|hsri |2Ps + σ2na) + σ2nc
, (20)
we have
rS,E,k =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
Ps|h˜
T
se,kw1|
2
trace(Sh†re,kh
T
re,k)+w
H
1 Dsˆe,kw1+σ
2
ne,k
)
. (21)
By some simple manipulation, (5) is reformulated as a per-relay jamming power constraint given by
trace(SEi) ≤ ηα¯iPs|hsri |2(1− |w1,i|2), ∀i. (22)
8SINRS,D =
Ps|sTsdu1|2
trace(Sh†rdh
T
rd) + σ
2
nau
H
1 diag(c0 ◦ ‖hrd‖.2)u1 + σ2ncuH2 diag(c0 ◦ ‖hrd‖.2)u2 + σ2nd
(23)
SINRS,E,k =
Ps|sTse,ku1|2
trace(Sh†re,kh
T
re,k) + σ
2
nau
H
1 diag(c0 ◦ ‖hre,k‖.2)u1 + σ2ncuH2 diag(c0 ◦ ‖hre,k‖.2)u2 + σ2ne,k
(24)
Now, the secrecy rate maximization problem w.r.t. ρi’s, ∡βi’s and S for SPS-based relays can be formulated as
(P1) : max
w1,S
(
(18)−max
k∈K
(21)
)+
s.t. (22), S  0.
B. AN-Aided Secrecy Relay Beamforming for DPS
Here, we consider the secrecy rate maximization problem for WEH-enabled AF relays with adjustable PS ratios
{αi} by jointly optimizing the AN beams, relay beam, WEH PS ratios {αi}, and AN PS ratios {ρi}.
First, consider the following variable transformation:

u1,i =
√
αi(1−αi)(1−ρi)
(1−αi)(|hsri |
2Ps+σ2na )+σ
2
nc
ej∡βi
u2,i =
√
αi(1−ρi)
(1−αi)(|hsri |
2Ps+σ2na )+σ
2
nc
, ∀i. (25)
Using this, |hTrdDβαhsr|2 can then be expressed as |sTsdu1|2, where ssd = [hsrihrid
√
η|hsri |2Ps]Ni=1 and u1 =
[u1,i]
N
i=1. Moreover, ‖hTrdDβα‖2 and ‖hTrdDβ‖2 can be simplified as uH1 diag(c0 ◦ ‖hrd‖.2)u1 and uH2 diag(c0 ◦
‖hrd‖.2)u2, respectively, where c0 = [c0,i]Ni=1 with c0,i = ηPs|hsri |2, ∀i, and u2 = [u2,i]Ni=1. Similarly, we
have |hTre,kDβαhsr|2 = |sTse,ku1|2, ‖hTre,kDβα‖2 = uH1 diag(c0 ◦ ‖hre,k‖.2)u1, and ‖hTre,kDβ‖2 = uH2 diag(c0 ◦
‖hre,k‖.2)u2, where sse,k = [hsrihrie,k
√
η|hsri |2Ps]Ni=1, ∀k ∈ K.
Then we apply the above transformation to SINRS,D (c.f. (8)) and SINRS,E,k (c.f. (9)), ∀k, to get (23) and (24)
(see next page). Now, we can recast the constraints w.r.t. S, αi’s, and ρi’s to those w.r.t. the transformed variables
u1,i’s and u2,i’s. In accordance with (25), the optimization variables, αi’s and ρi’s, can be alternatively given by
 αi = 1−
|u1,i|2
|u2,i|2
ρi = 1− |u2,i|
2(c1,i|u1,i|2+σ2nc |u2,i|
2)
|u2,i|2−|u1,i|2
, ∀i, (26)
where c1,i = Ps|hsri |2 + σ2na . Replacing αi’s and ρi’s with (26), (5) is reformulated as
trace(SEi) ≤ c0,i
(
1− |u2,i|
2(c1,i|u1,i|2 + σ2nc |u2,i|2)
|u2,i|2 − |u1,i|2
)(
1− |u1,i|
2
|u2,i|2
)
, ∀i. (27)
On the other hand, since αi ≥ 0 and ρi ≥ 0, ∀i, after some simple manipulation, it follows from (26) that
|u1,i|2 − |u2,i|2 ≤ 0, ∀i, (28)
|u2,i|2(c1,i|u1,i|2 + σ2nc |u2,i|2) ≤ |u2,i|2 − |u1,i|2, ∀i. (29)
9As such, the secrecy rate maximization problem for DPS-based relays becomes
(P2) : max
u1,u2,S
(1
2
log2(1 + SINRS,D)
− 1
2
log2(1 + max
k∈K
SINRS,E,k)
)+
s.t. (27), (28), and (29).
IV. CENTRALIZED SECURE AF RELAYING
In this section, we resort to centralized approaches to solve problem (P1) and (P2), respectively, assuming that
there is a central optimizer that is able to collect all CSIs including hsr, hrd and hre, perform the optimization,
and broadcast to relays their individual optimized parameters.
A. Optimal Solutions for SPS
To start with, we recast (P1) into a two-stage problem by introducing a slack variable τ . First of all, we solve
the epigraph reformulation of (P1) with a fixed τ ∈ (0, 1] as
(P1.1) : max
w1,S0
Ps|h˜Tsdw1|2
trace(Sh†rdh
T
rd) +w
H
1 Dsˆdw1 + σ
2
nd
s.t. (22) and
1 +
Ps|h˜Tse,kw1|2
trace(Sh†re,kh
T
re,k) +w
H
1 D ˆse,kw1 + σ
2
ne,k
≤ 1/τ, ∀k.
Defining f1(τ) as the optimum value of (P1.1) and denoting H1(τ) = τf1(τ), the objective function of (P1) is
given by
1
2
log2(1 + f1(τ))−
1
2
log2(1/τ) =
1
2
log2(τ +H1(τ)), (30)
where (·)+ in the objective function has been omitted and we claim a zero secrecy rate if (30) admits a negative
value. As a result, (P1) can be equivalently given by
(P1.2) : max
τmin,1≤τ≤1
log2(τ +H1(τ)).
Note that this single-variable optimization problem allows for simple one-dimension search over τ ∈ [τmin,1, 1],
assuming that H1(τ) is attainable given any τ in this region. As the physical meaning of 1/τ − 1 in (P1.1) can be
interpreted as the maximum permitted SINR for the best eavesdropper’s channel, feasibility for a non-zero secrecy
10
rate implies that
τ ≥ 1
1 +
Ps|h˜
T
sdw1|
2/σ2nd
trace(Sh†rdh
T
rd)/σ
2
nd
+wH1 Dsˆdw1/σ
2
nd
+1
(a)
≥ 1
1 + Ps‖h˜sd‖2‖w1‖2/σ2nd
(b)
≥ 1
1 +NPs‖h˜sd‖2/σ2nd
= τmin,1, (31)
where Cauchy-Schwarz inequality has been applied in (a) and (b) follows from |w1,i|2 ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N .
The above epigraph reformulation of non-convex problems like (P1) has been widely employed in the literature
[20, 36], and (P1.2) admits the same optimal value as (P1) while (P1.1) with the optimal τ provides the corre-
sponding optimal solution to (P1). We summarize the steps for solving (P1) here: given any τ ∈ [τmin,1, 1], solve
(P1.1) to obtain H1(τ); solve (P1.2) via a one-dimensional search over τ . Before developing solutions to (P1.1),
we have the lemma below.
Lemma 4.1: H1(τ) is a concave function of τ .
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 4.1: Using Lemma 4.1, it is easy to verify that 12 log2(τ + H1(τ)) is also a concave function of τ
according to the composition rule [33, pp. 84], which allows for a more effective search for the optimum τ , e.g.,
bi-section method, than the exhaustive search used in [28]. Moreover, although H1(τ) is not differentiable w.r.t. τ ,
the bi-section method can still be implemented, the algorithm involving which is similarly applied in solving (P2)
and thus will be given later in Section IV-B.
In the sequel, we focus on solving (P1.1). By introducing X1 = w1wH1 and ignoring the rank-one constraint
on X1, (P1.1) can be alternatively solved by
(P1.1-SDR) :

max
X1,S0
τPstrace(X1h˜
†
sdh˜
T
sd)
trace(Sh†rdh
T
rd) + trace(X1Dsˆd) + σ
2
nd
s.t.
Pstrace(X1h˜
†
se,kh˜
T
se,k)
trace(Sh†re,kh
T
re,k) + trace(X1Dsˆe,k) + σ
2
ne,k
≤ 1
τ
− 1, ∀k,
trace((S + ηα¯iPs|hsri |2X1)Ei) ≤ ηα¯iPs|hsri |2, ∀i.
Note that the objective function has been multiplied by τ compared with that of (P1.1) for ready computation of
H1(τ).
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Although (P1.1-SDR) is made easier to solve than (P1.1) by rank relaxation, it is still a quasi-convex problem
considering the linear fractional form of the objective function and constraints, for which Charnes-Cooper trans-
formation [34] will be applied for equivalent convex reformulation. Specifically, by substituting X1 = Xˆ1/ξ and
S = Sˆ/ξ into (P1.1-SDR), it follows that
(P1.1-SDP) :

max
Xˆ1,Sˆ0,ξ≥0
Pstrace(Xˆ1h˜
†
sdh˜
T
sd)
s.t. trace(Sˆh†rdh
T
rd) + trace(Xˆ1Dsˆd) + ξσ
2
nd = τ,(
1
τ
− 1
)(
trace(Sˆh†re,kh
T
re,k) + trace(Xˆ1Dsˆe,k)
+ξσ2ne,k
) ≥ Pstrace(Xˆ1h˜†se,kh˜Tse,k), ∀k,
trace((Sˆ + ηα¯iPs|hsri |2Xˆ1)Ei) ≤ ξηα¯iPs|hsri |2, ∀i.
Problem (P1.1-SDP) can now be optimally and efficiently solved using interior-point based methods by some
off-the-shelf convex optimization toolboxes, e.g., CVX [35].
Proposition 4.1: We have the following results:
1) The optimal solution to (P1.1-SDP) satisfies rank(Xˆ∗1) = 1;
2) Xˆ∗1 = wˆ∗1wˆ∗H1 , where wˆ∗1 is given by
wˆ∗1 =
√√√√τ − ξ∗σ2nd − trace(Sˆ∗h†rdhTrd)
trace(wˆ1wˆ
H
1 Dsˆd)
wˆ1, (32)
in which wˆ1 is given in Appendix B;
3) rank(Sˆ∗) ≤ min(K,N).
Proof: See Appendix B.
Proposition 4.1 implies that the rank-one relaxation of (P1.1-SDR) from (P1.1) is tight for an arbitrary given
τ . The ρ∗’s and ∡β∗i ’s can thus be retrieved from the magnitude and angle of w∗1, respectively, by applying EVD
to X∗1.
B. Proposed Solutions for DPS
Similar to Section IV-A, in this section, we aim at solving the two-stage reformulation of (P2) by introducing
a slack variable τ ∈ [τmin,2, 1]. First, for a given τ , we solve
(P2.1) : max
u1,u2,S
(23) s.t. (24), ∀k, (27)− (29).
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Next, denoting τf2(τ) by H2(τ), where f2(τ) is the optimum value for problem (P2.1), we solve the following
problem that attains the same optimum value as (P2):
(P2.2) : max
τ
log2(τ +H2(τ)) s.t. τmin,2 ≤ τ ≤ 1,
where τmin,2 is similarly derived as τmin,1 so that we directly arrive at τ ≥ 11+Ps‖ssd‖2 ∑Ni=1 1σ2nd (|hsri |2Ps+σ2na+σ2nc )
,
denoted by τmin,2. We claim that (P2.2) can be solved by bi-section for τ over the interval [τmin,2, 1] assuming
that H2(τ) is valid for any given τ (Otherwise a zero secrecy rate, i.e., H2(τ) = 0, is returned.), since H2(τ) has
the following property.
Lemma 4.2: H2(τ) is a concave function of τ .
Proof: The proof is similar to that for Lemma 4.1, and thus is omitted.
It is also seen that how to attain H2(τ) forms the main thrust for solving (P2). However, the constraints in (27),
(28) and (29) are not convex w.r.t. u1,i and/or u2,i, ∀i, due to their high orders and multiplicative structure. (P2.1)
thus turns out to be very hard to solve in general. To cope with these non-convex constraints, we introduce the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.3 ([25]): The restricted hyperbolic constraints which have the form xHx ≤ yz, where x ∈ CN×1,
y, z ≥ 0, are equivalent to rotated second-order cone (SOC) constraints as follows.∥∥∥∥∥
(
2x
y − z
)∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ y + z. (33)
For convenience, denoting |u1,i|2, |u2,i|2, trace(SEi) by xi, yi, and zi, respectively , ∀i, (27) can be rewritten
as
zi ≤c0,i
(
1− yi(c1,ixi + σ
2
ncyi)
yi − xi
)(
1− xi
yi
)
⇔ zi
c0,i
≤ 1− xi
yi
− (c1,ixi + σ2ncyi)
⇔ (σncyi)2 +
(√(
1− zi
c0,i
)
1
c1,i
)2
≤
(
1− zi
c0,i
− c1,sr,ixi
)(
yi +
1
c1,i
)
. (34)
According to (5) and (25), it is easily verified that 1− zic0,sr,i − c1,sr,ixi > 1− ρiαi − (1− ρi)αi ≥ 0. Hence, (34)
is eligible for Lemma 4.3, which is reformulated into the SOC constraint:∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2σncyi
2
√(
1− zic0,i
)
1
c1,i(
1− zic0,i − c1,ixi
)
−
(
yi +
1
c1,i
)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤
(
1− zic0,i − c1,ixi
)
+
(
yi +
1
c1,i
)
. (35)
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τPstrace(U1s
†
sds
T
sd)
trace(Sh†rdh
T
rd) + trace((σ
2
naU1 + σ
2
ncU2)diag(c0 ◦ ‖hrd‖.2)) + σ2nd
(39)
1 +
Pstrace(U 1s
†
se,ks
T
se,k)
trace(Sh†re,kh
T
re,k) + trace((σ
2
naU1 + σ
2
ncU2)diag(c0 ◦ ‖hre,k‖.2)) + σ2ne,k
≤ 1
τ
(40)
Similarly, (29) can be simplified as yi(c1,ixi + σ2ncyi) ≤ yi − xi, and after some manipulation, it is recast into a
constraint of the restricted hyperbolic form as
(σncyi)
2 +
(√
1
c1,i
)2
≤ (1− c1,ixi)
(
yi +
1
c1,i
)
. (36)
(36) is thus, in line with Lemma 4.3, equivalent to an SOC constraint given by∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2σncyi
2
√
1
c1,i
(1− c1,ixi)−
(
yi +
1
c1,i
)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤ (1− c1,ixi) +
(
yi +
1
c1,i
)
. (37)
At last, (28) is a linear constraint w.r.t. xi and yi given by
xi − yi ≤ 0, ∀i. (38)
Note that (27)–(29) have so far been equivalently transformed into the SOC constraints (35), the linear constraints
(38), as well as (37), the latter two of which are jointly convex w.r.t. xi and yi, ∀i. However, (35) is still not convex
w.r.t. zi, ∀i, yet. To circumvent this, in the sequel we propose to solve problem (P2) by alternating optimization.
The upshot of the algorithm is that first we fix S by S and thus zi by z¯i = trace(SEi), ∀i, and solve problem
(P2′)3 to find the optimal {α∗}, {ρ∗} and {∡βi} via (P2′.1) and (P2′.2); then with α¯i = α∗i , ∀i, we devise the
optimal solution derived in Section IV-A to obtain the optimal CJ covariance, viz S∗, and thus z∗i = trace(S∗Ei),
∀i; finally, by updating S = S∗ and z¯i = z∗i , ∀i, problems (P2′) and (P1) are iteratively solved until they converge.
The remaining challenges lie in solving problem (P2′.1) now that (35), (37) and (38) are all made convex
w.r.t. their variables xi, yi, ∀i. Similar to that for (P1.1), we introduce U1 = u1uH1 and U2 = u2uH2 and exempt
problem (P2′.1) from rank(U 1) = 1 and rank(U2) = 1 as follows:
(P2′.1-SDR) :

max
U1,U20,{xi},{yi}
H2(τ)
s.t. (40), ∀k, (35), (37), (38),
trace(U1Ei) = xi, trace(U 2Ei) = yi, ∀i.
3Note that we denote problem (P2) ((P2.1),(P2.2)) with fixed S as (P2′) ((P2′.1),(P2′.2)) in the sequel.
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H2(τ) (c.f. (39)) and (40) are given at the top of next page. Recalling the procedure to deal with (P1.1-SDR), we
now apply Charnes-Cooper transformation to convert (P2′.1-SDR) into a convex problem, denoted by (P2′.1-SDP),
by replacing U1 and U2 with Uˆ1/ξ and Uˆ 2/ξ, respectively. The solution for (P2′.1-SDP) is tight and characterized
by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2: We have the following results:
1) The optimal solution to (P2′.1-SDP) satisfies rank(Uˆ ∗1) = 1 such that Uˆ
∗
1 = uˆ
∗
1uˆ
∗H
1 ;
2) uˆ∗1 is given by
uˆ∗1 =
√√√√√√√
τ − ξ∗σ2nd − σ2nctrace(Uˆ
∗
2Crd)
−ξ∗trace(Sh†rdhTrd)
σ2natrace(uˆ1uˆ
H
1 Crd)
uˆ1, (41)
where uˆ1 = (Ξ′ +
∑K
k=1 θ
∗
kPss
†
se,ks
T
se,k)
−1s
†
sd, Crd = diag(c0 ◦ ‖hrd‖.2), and Ξ′ is given in Appendix C;
3) Uˆ∗2, of which the diagonal entries compose a vector denoted by uˆ∗2, can be reconstructed by uˆ∗2uˆ∗H2 with rank
one.
Proof: See Appendix C.
The α∗i ’s and ρi’s are thus attained according to (26) via EVD of U∗1 and U∗2. The proposed algorithm for solving
(P2) is presented in Table I.
V. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHMS
In this section, we investigate heuristic algorithms to solve problems (P1) and (P2) in a completely distributed
fashion. Note that different from the paradigm of distributed optimization that allows for certain amount of infor-
mation exchange based on which iterative algorithms are developed to gradually improve the system performance,
we herein assume that each individual relay can only make decision based on its local CSIs, namely, hsri , hrid,
hrie, ∀i, and there is no extra means of information acquisition for ease of implementation. The purpose for such
an algorithm is twofold: on one hand, we aim to answer the question that in the least favourable situation, namely,
no coordination over the relays, how to improve the achievable secrecy rate of the system? On the other hand, it
provides a lower-bound for the centralized schemes proposed in Section IV, which sheds light upon the trade-off
achievable between secrecy performance and complexity.
Besides, we emphasize the jamming scheme that is different from the CJ in the centralized schemes. Unlike the
CJ signal coordinately transmitted by all relays, in the distributed implementation, each relay is only able to generate
its AN locally, i.e., xr2 = [
√
σ1s
′
1, . . . ,
√
σNs
′
N ]
T
, in which si’s are i.i.d. AN beams, denoted by s′i ∼ CN (0, 1).
This type of CJ is known to be uncoordinated with the covariance matrix given by S = diag([σ1, . . . , σN ]). In this
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TABLE I
Algorithm for Solving (P2)
Require: S∗; r∗SPS that denotes the optimum value for (P1) given α¯i = .5, ∀i
1: ii← 0, r(ii)sec ← r∗SPS
2: repeat
3: ii← ii+ 1
4: S¯ ← S∗ , z¯i ← trace(S∗Ei), ∀i, and solve (P2′):
5: kk ← 0, r(0)DPS ← 10
−6
, r
(1)
DPS ← 10, l← τmin,2, u← 1
6: while |r(kk+1)DPS − r
(kk)
DPS|/r
(kk)
DPS > ǫb do
7: kk ← kk + 1, τ ← l+u
2
8: solve (P2′.1) and
9: return H2(τ )
10: r(kk+1)DPS ← 12 log2(τ +H2(τ ))
11: rtemp ← 12 log2(τ˜ +H2(τ˜)), where τ˜ ← max(τ −∆τ, τmin,1) and ∆τ > 0 denotes an arbitrary small value.
12: if r(kk+1)DPS ≤ rtemp then
13: u← τ
14: else
15: l← τ
16: end if
17: end while
18: return U∗1, U∗2 , and obtain {α∗i } according to (26)
19: α¯i ← α∗i , ∀i, and solve (P1) via (P1.1) and (P1.2)
20: return X∗1, S∗, and obtain {ρ∗i } and {∡β∗i } according to w∗1,i =
√
1− ρ∗i e
j∡β∗i , ∀i
21: Update r(ii)sec according to (13)
22: until r(ii)sec − r(ii−1)sec ≤ ǫ0
Ensure: {α∗i }, {ρ∗i }, {∡β∗i }, and S∗
section, we assume that each relay consumes all of its remaining power from AF for AN, i.e., σi = ηρiαiPs|hsri |2,
∀i ∈ N (c.f. (5)). Hence, the AN design solely depends on αi’s and/or ρi’s.
A. Distributed Algorithm for SPS
First, we propose a heuristic scheme for the ith AF relay to decide on ρi, ∀i, which is given by
ρi = δ

1− |hrid|2
max
k∈K
|hrie,k|2


+
, (42)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant controlling the relay’s level of jamming. For example, a larger δ indicates that each
relay prefers to splitting a larger portion of power for jamming and vice versa. The intuition behind (42) is that if
the ith relay observes that |hrid|2 ≥ max
kK
|hrie,k|2, which means that a nonnegative secrecy rate is achievable even
if there is only itself in the system, it will shut down the AN; otherwise, it will split up to δ portion of the harvested
power for jamming. In an extreme case of |hrid|2 ≪ max
kK
|hrie,k|2, probably when an Eve is located within the
very proximity of this relay, it allocates the maximum permissible portion of power, i.e., δ, for AN.
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Next, since an individual relay cannot evaluate the secrecy performance of the whole system, ∡βi’s are simply
chosen to be the optimum for the multi-AF relaying without security considerations, i.e., ∡βi = −∡hrid − ∡hsri ,
∀i.
B. Distributed Algorithm for DPS
Following the same designs for ρi’s and ∡βi’s in Section V-A, the remaining task for WEH-enabled relays
operating with DPS is to set proper values for αi’s. We choose αi’s that maximize the “hypothetical SINR”. This
“hypothetical” SINR may not be the actual SINR for the destination, but just a criterion calculated based on the
“hypothetical” received signal seen by the ith relay, given by
y˜di = hridβi
√
1− αi
√
Pshsris+ hridβi
√
1− αina,i + hridβinc,i + hrid
√
σis
′
i + nd, ∀i. (43)
The corresponding SINR is thus expressed as
SINRy˜di =
η(1− ρi)Ps|hsri |2
ησ2na +
ησ2nc
1−αi
+
γi(Ps|hsri |
2+σ2na)
αi
+
γiσ2nc
αi(1−αi)
+ ηρiPs|hsri |2
, (44)
where γi =
σ2nd
Ps|hsri |
2|hrid|
2 . Consequently, the maximization of (44) w.r.t. αi, ∀i, is formulated as
(P2-distr.) :

min
αi
ησ2nc
1− αi +
γi(Ps|hsri |2 + σ2na)
αi
+
γiσ
2
nc
αi(1− αi)
s.t. 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1.
Proposition 5.1: The optimal αi, ∀i, to (P2-distr.) is
α∗i =
1
1 +
√
(η+γi)σ2nc
γi(Ps|hsri |
2+σ2na+σ
2
nc
)
. (45)
Proof: It is easy to verify that problem (P2-distr.) is convex and the minimum solution of its objective function
derived from the first-order derivative happens to fall within the feasible region of αi, which is seen in (45).
With ρi’s, ∡βi’s and αi’s set, each AF relay is then able to decide its relay weight and AN transmission.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we compare our proposed schemes operating with SPS or DPS with some benchmarks. In the
centralized case, the optimal solution for SPS in Section IV-A is denoted by CJ-SPS, while Algorithm I in
Section IV-B is denoted by CJ-DPS. The distributed schemes in Section V-A and Section V-B are referred to
as Distributed-SPS and Distributed-DPS, respectively. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our AN-aided secure
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multi-AF relay beamforming algorithms, we also provide three benchmark schemes: NoCJ-SPS, NoCJ-DPS and
Random PS. For NoCJ-SPS, we solve problem (P1) by replacing S with 0. Similarly, for NoCJ-DPS, we initialize
S = 0 and quit the loop in Algorithm I after the very first time of solving problem (P2′). Random PS, on the other
hand, picks up i.i.d. αi and ρi uniformly generated over [0, 1], respectively, and co-phases ∡βi = −∡hsri −∡hrid,
∀i.
Consider that N WEH-enabled AF relays and K eavesdroppers are located within a circular area of radius R.
Specifically, we assume that their respective radius and radian are drawn from uniform distributions over the interval
[0, R] and [0, 2pi), respectively. We also assume that the channel models consist of both large-scale path loss and
small-scale multi-path fading. The unified path loss model is given by
L = A0
(
d
d0
)−α
, (46)
where A0 = 10−3, d denotes the relevant distance, d0 = 1m is a reference distance, and α is the path loss exponent
set to be 2.5. hsri , hrid, and hrie,k, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K, are generated from independent Rayleigh fading with zero
mean and variance specified by (46).
The simulation parameters are set as follows unless otherwise specified: the radius defining the range is R = 5m;
the transmit power at the source is Ps = 40dBm; the noise variances are set as σ2na = −50dBm, σ2nc = −80dBm,
σ2nd = σ
2
na +σ
2
nc , and σ
2
ne,k
= σ2nd , ∀k; the EH efficiency is set to η = 50%. Also, numerical results were averages
over 500 independent channel realizations.
A. Secrecy Performance by Centralized Approach
Here, we evaluate the performance of the proposed centralized designs in Section IV. The efficiency of the
alternating optimization that iteratively attains numerical solution to (P2) is studied in Fig. 3, which shows the
increment of the achievable secrecy rate after each round of the iteration. The most rapid increase is observed
after the first iteration, which illustrates that the optimization of the PS ratios, αi’s, accounts for the main factor
for the secrecy rate performance gains over a SPS scheme that sets {αi = 0.5}. It is seen that the alternating
algorithm converges within the relative tolerance set to be 10−3, after an average of 5–6 iterations for several
channel realizations, which appears reasonable in terms of complexity.
Fig. 4 shows the achievable secrecy rate for the legitimate Rx with the increase in the number of AF relays
by different schemes. As we can see, the secure multi-AF relaying schemes assisted by the transmission of
AN outperforms that without AN for both SPS and DPS. In addition, with the increase in N , the role of CJ
gradually reduces for both schemes of SPS and DPS. This is because as N gets larger, the optimal designs tend to
18
Times of iteration
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Se
cr
ec
y 
ra
te
 fo
r t
he
 R
x 
(bp
s/H
z)
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Channel realization 1
Channel realization 2
Channel realization 3
Channel realization 4
Channel realization 5
Fig. 3. The secrecy rate by CJ-DPS versus the number of iterations for the alternating optimization in Table I with Ps = 40dBm, N = 10,
and K = 5.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of different schemes with Ps = 10dB for K = 5 and K = 10, respectively.
suppress the interception at the most capable eavesdropper more effectively with N DoF, enforcing the numerator
of maxk∈K SINRS,E,k to a relatively low level, which can also be observed from maxk∈K rS,E,k in Fig. 4(a),
and therefore the optimal amount of power allocated to AN beams inclines to be little; otherwise the jamming
yielded will be detrimental to the reception at the legitimate Rx. Besides, given the same number of AF relays, the
secrecy performance gains brought by the proposed schemes with CJ are more prominent in the presence of more
eavesdroppers, since it is hard to reduce all the eavesdroppers’ channel capacity without resorting to CJ properly.
Fig. 5 shows the achievable secrecy rate for the legitimate Rx versus the number of eavesdroppers by different
schemes. First, similar to the results shown in Fig. 4, the proposed AN-aided multi-AF relaying designs operating
with DPS-enabled relays, viz CJ-DPS, perform best among all the schemes. Secondly, as K goes up, the AN-aided
schemes, CJ-DPS and CJ-SPS, allow the secrecy rate to drop slowly, in other words, more robust against multiple
eavesdroppers, while the secrecy rate of their NoCJ counterparts almost goes down linearly with K. Furthermore,
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Fig. 5. The secrecy rate versus the number of eavesdroppers with Ps = 10dB for N = 10 and N = 20, respectively.
with K increasing, for example, more than 10, the increase in the number of relays, from N = 10 to 20, cannot
replace the role of CJ as shown in Fig. 4 and 5, since in the presence of many eavesdroppers, more relays may
also result in improved eavesdroppers’ decoding ability w/o the assistance of CJ. It is also noteworthy that with
K = 1, there is little use of CJ by the centralized schemes, which was also observed in [36].
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Fig. 6. The secrecy rate versus the transmit power with K = 5 for N = 10 and N = 20, respectively.
Fig. 6 provides simulation results of different schemes by varying the source transmit power. It is seen that with
more power available at the source, the advantage of CJ is more pronounced, since given other variables fixed,
larger Ps indicates larger feasible regions for (P1) and (P2). Furthermore, as similarly seen in Fig. 4, with a mild
number of eavesdroppers (K = 5), subject to the same Ps, a large number of cooperative relays enables more DoF
in designing the optimal αi’s and ∡βi’s, which alleviates the dependence on AN beams to combat Eves.
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B. Secrecy Performance by Distributed Algorithms
Here, we study the performance of the distributed schemes, namely, Distributed-SPS and Distributed-DPS in
Section V. As mentioned earlier, these heuristics are provided as benchmarks to demonstrate what can be done
under the extreme “no-coordination” circumstance, in comparison with Random PS. Note that any other distributed
schemes with certain level of cooperation among relays are supposed to increase the secrecy performance up to the
proposed centralized algorithms, namely, CJ-DPS and CJ-SPS, at the expense of extra computational complexity
and system overhead.
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Fig. 7. The secrecy rate versus the number of AF relays by distributed algorithms with Ps = 10dB and K = 5.
Fig. 7 provides the results for the achievable secrecy rate of various schemes versus the number of relays.
Distributed-SPS and Distributed-DPS, are observed to be outperformed by their centralized counterparts though,
they are considerably superior to Random PS. It is also seen that the performance gap between the centralized
and distributed approaches is enlarged as N increases, which is expected, since larger N yields more DoF for
cooperation that is exclusively beneficial for the centralized schemes. Furthermore, compared with the centralized
schemes, the distributed ones are more vulnerable to the increase in the eavesdroppers’ number.
In Fig. 8, we investigate the relationship between the secrecy rate performance and the number of eavesdroppers
by different methods. As can be observed, compared with the centralized schemes, the secrecy rates achieved
by Distributed-SPS and Distributed-DPS both reduce more drastically with the increase in K due to the lack of
effective cooperation. Also, the advantage of DPS over SPS for the distributed schemes is compromised since αi’s
are not jointly designed with other parameters. At last, a similar observation has been made as that for Fig. 7, that
is, larger N yields more visible performance gap between the centralized and distributed approaches.
In Fig. 9, we examine the effect of increasing the transmit power at the source on the secrecy performance
of different schemes under the same settings as those in Fig. 6. Among all the presented designs, CJ-DPS still
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Fig. 8. The secrecy rate versus the number of eavesdroppers by distributed algorithms with Ps = 10dB and N=8.
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Fig. 9. The secrecy rate versus transmit power by distributed algorithms with N = 10 and K = 5.
achieves the best secrecy rate as observed in other examples. Also, the fact that larger N benefits more from
cooperative designs is corroborated again due to the same reason as that for Fig. 7 and 8. Furthermore, the secrecy
rate of Distributed-SPS or Distributed-DPS is quickly saturated when Ps > 20dB while that for their centralized
counterparts still rises at fast speed.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper studied secure communications using multiple single-antenna WEH-enabled AF relays assisted by
AN via CJ for a SWIPT network with multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers. Using PS at the relays, the achievable
secrecy rates for the relay wiretap channel were maximized by jointly optimizing the CB and the CJ covariance
matrix along with the PS ratios for relays operating with, respectively, SPS and DPS. For DPS, Reformulating the
constraints into restricted hyperbolic forms enabled us to develop convex optimization-based solutions. Further, we
proposed an information-exchange-free distributed algorithm that outperforms the random decision.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 4.1
As the optimal solution to (P1.1-SDP) is proved to be optimal to problem (P1.1), the optimum value for
(P1.1-SDP) is τf1(τ) = H1(τ). Hence, we identify the property of H1(τ) by investigating (P1.1-SDP), with its
Lagrangian given by
L(χ) =trace




Psh˜
†
sdh˜
T
sd − λDsˆd
+
∑K
k=1 θk
(
1
τ − 1
)
Dsˆe,k
−∑Kk=1 θkPsh˜†se,kh˜Tse,k
−W
1
2
0 UW
1
2
0 + Y 1

 Xˆ1

+ trace




−λh†rdhTrd
+
∑K
k=1 θk
(
1
τ − 1
)
h
†
re,kh
T
re,k
−U + Y 2

 Sˆ


+

 −λσ2nd +∑Kk=1 θk ( 1τ − 1)σ2ne,k
+trace
(
W
1
2
0UW
1
2
0
)
+ ζ

 ξ + λτ, (47)
where χ denotes a tuple consisting of all the primal and dual variables. Specifically, Y 1, Y 2 and λ are Lagrangian
multipliers associated with Xˆ1, Sˆ and the first constraint of (P1.1-SDP), respectively; {θk} are the dual variables
associated with the SINR constraint for the kth Eve, respectively; U = diag([ui]Ni=1) with each diagonal entry ui
denoting the dual variable associated with the per-relay power constraint; ζ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated
with ξ ≥ 0. In addition, W 0 = diag([ηα¯iPs|hsri |2]Ni=1). The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for (47) are
partially listed as follows:
Y 1 = −Psh˜†sdh˜
T
sd + λDsˆd −
K∑
k=1
θk
(
1
τ
− 1
)
Dsˆe,k +
K∑
k=1
θkPsh˜
†
se,kh˜
T
se,k +W
1
2
0UW
1
2
0 , (48a)
Y 2 = λh
†
rdh
T
rd −
K∑
k=1
θk
(
1
τ
− 1
)
h
†
re,kh
T
re,k +U , (48b)
ζ = λσ2nd −
K∑
k=1
θk
(
1
τ
− 1
)
σ2ne,k − trace(W
1
2
0UW
1
2
0 ). (48c)
The associated dual problem is accordingly given by
(P1.1-SDP-dual) :

min
λ,{θk},{ui}
λτ
s.t. θk ≥ 0, ∀k, ui ≥ 0, ∀i,
λ ≥ 0, ζ ≥ 0, Y 1  0, Y 2  0,
where Y 1, Y 2, and ζ are given by (48a)–(48c), respectively. Since it is easily verified that (P1.1-SDP) satisfies
the Slater condition, the strong duality holds [33]. This implies that the dual optimum value in (P1.1-SDP-dual)
is H1(τ), which turns out to be a point-wise minimum of a family of affine functions and thus concave over
τ ∈ [τmin,1, 1] [33, pp. 80].
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B. Proof of Proposition 4.1
The KKT conditions for (47) yield the following complementary slackness:
Y 1Xˆ
∗
1 = 0, (49a)
Y 2Sˆ
∗
= 0. (49b)
Pre- and post-multiplying W
1
2
0 with the left hand side (LHS) and right hand side (RHS) of (48b), respectively, and
substituting W
1
2
0U
∗W
1
2
0 into (48a), Y ∗1 can be rewritten as
Y 1 =− Psh˜†sdh˜
T
sd + λDsˆd −
K∑
k=1
θk
(
1
τ
− 1
)
Dsˆe,k − λW
1
2
0h
†
rdh
T
rdW
1
2
0 +
K∑
k=1
θkPsh˜
†
se,kh˜
T
se,k
+W
1
2
0Y 2W
1
2
0 +
K∑
k=1
θk
(
1
τ
− 1
)
W
1
2
0h
†
re,kh
T
re,kW
1
2
0 . (50)
Introducing the notation of [·]offd to represent a square matrix with its diagonal entries removed, it follows from (48b)
that 
 W 120Y 2W 120 − λW 120h†rdhTrdW 120
−∑Kk=1 θk ( 1τ − 1)W 120h†re,khTre,kW 120


offd
= 0. (51)
By subtracting (51) from (50), Y 1 can be rewritten as
Y 1 =− Psh˜†sdh˜
T
sd + λDsˆd −
K∑
k=1
θk
(
1
τ
− 1
)
Dsˆe,k −

 λW 120h†rdhTrdW 120
−∑Kk=1 θk ( 1τ − 1)W 120h†re,khTre,kW 120


d
+
[
W
1
2
0Y 2W
1
2
0
]
d
+
K∑
k=1
θkPsh˜
†
se,kh˜
T
se,k, (52)
where [·]d denotes a square matrix with only the diagonal remained. Observing that
(Dsˆd)
−1Dsˆe =
[
W
1
2
0h
†
rdh
T
rdW
1
2
0
]−1
d
[
W
1
2
0h
†
re,kh
T
re,kW
1
2
0
]
d
= diag
(
[|hrie,k|2 / |hrid|2]Ni=1
)
≡ Red,k, (53)
Y ∗1 can be finally recast as
Y ∗1 = −Psh˜
†
sdh˜
T
sd +Ξ+
K∑
k=1
θkPsh˜
†
se,kh˜
T
se,k, (54)
where
Ξ =
[
W
1
2
0Y 2W
1
2
0
]
d
−
([
W
1
2
0h
†
rdh
T
rdW
1
2
0
]
d
−Dsˆd
)(
λI −
K∑
k=1
θk
(
1
τ
− 1
)
Red,k
)
. (55)
In the following, we show that Ξ +
∑K
k=1 θkPsh˜
†
se,kh˜
T
se,k is a positive definite matrix. Note that since Ξ is a
diagonal matrix, its definiteness is only determined by the signs of its diagonal entries, for which we commence
with the discussion in three difference cases below.
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∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2σnctrace(U 2Ei)
2
√(
1− z¯ic0,i
)
1
c1,i(
1− z¯ic0,i − c1,itrace(U 1Ei)
)
−
(
trace(U2Ei) +
1
c1,i
)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤
(
1− z¯i
c0,i
− c1,ixi
)
+
(
yi +
1
c1,i
)
(56)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2σnctrace(U 2Ei)
2
√
1
c1,i
(1− c1,itrace(U 1Ei))−
(
trace(U2Ei) +
1
c1,i
)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤ (1− c1,ixi) +
(
yi +
1
c1,i
)
(57)
1) Case I: ∃i such that λ−∑Kk=1 θk ( 1τ − 1) [Red,k]i,i < 0. Since [[W 120h†rdhTrdW 120 ]d −Dsˆd
]
i,i
=
ηα¯iPs|hsri |2|hrid|2
(
1− (1−α¯i)σ2na+σ2nc(1−α¯i)(|hsri |2Ps+σ2na)+σ2nc
)
> 0, it follows from (55) that [Ξ]i,i > 0 in this case.
2) Case II: ∃i such that λ−∑Kk=1 θk ( 1τ − 1) [Red,k]i,i > 0. We have [[W 120Y 2W 120 ]d
]
i,i
− [W 0]i,i|hrid|2(λ∗−∑K
k=1 θk
(
1
τ − 1
)
[Red,k]i,i) ≥ 0 in accordance with (48b), which implies that [Ξ]i,i =
[[
W
1
2
0Y 2W
1
2
0
]
d
]
i,i
−
[W 0]i,i|hrid|2(λ−
∑K
k=1 θk
(
1
τ − 1
)
[Red,k]i,i) + [Dsˆd]i,i(λ−
∑K
k=1 θk
(
1
τ − 1
)
[Red,k]i,i) > 0 (c.f. (55)).
3) Case III: ∃i such that λ−∑Kk=1 θk ( 1τ − 1) [Red,k]i,i = 0. In this case, it follows that [Ξ]i,i = [W 120Y 2W 120 ]i,i
≥ 0. It is noteworthy that the number of i’s such that λ−∑Kk=1 θk ( 1τ − 1) [Red,k]i,i = 0 cannot exceed one.
This can be proved by contradiction as follows. If ∃i1, i2, i1 6= i2, such that λ−
∑K
k=1 θk
(
1
τ − 1
)
[Red,k]i1,i1 = 0
and λ −∑Kk=1 θk ( 1τ − 1) [Red,k]i2,i2 = 0, it implies that ∑Kk=1 θk[Red,k]i1,i1 = ∑Kk=1 θk[Red,k]i2,i2 , which
contradicts to the fact that for any two independent continuously distributed random variables, the chance that
they are equal is zero.
In summary, [Ξ]i,i ≥ 0, ∀i. If [Ξ]i,i > 0, then it is obvious that Ξ+
∑K
k=1 θkPsh˜
†
se,kh˜
T
se,k ≻ 0. Next, we show
that it still holds true in the case that ∃i′, such that [Ξ]i′,i′ = 0, i′ ∈ N , by definition. Define the null-space of Ξ
by ψ = {η|η = αei′ , α ∈ C} and multiply ηH and η, ∀η 6= 0, on the LHS and RHS of Ξ+
∑K
k=1 θkPsh˜
†
se,kh˜
T
se,k,
respectively. If η /∈ ψ, it is straightforward to obtain ηH(Ξ+∑Kk=1 θkPsh˜†se,kh˜Tse,k)η > 0; otherwise, it follows that
ηH(Ξ +
∑K
k=1 θkPsh˜
†
se,kh˜
T
se,k)η =
∑K
k=1 θkPsα
2|[h˜se,k]i′ |2 > 0, as [h˜se,k]i′ 6= 0 in probability. This completes
the proof. As a result, Y 1 in (54) is shown to always take on a special structure, that is, a full-rank matrix minus
a rank-one matrix. Note that this observation plays a key role in proving the rank-one property of Xˆ∗1, which is
also identified in [20, Appendix C].
Finally, multiplying both sides of (54) by Xˆ∗1, as per (49a), we obtain the following equation:
Xˆ
∗
1 = Ps
(
Ξ+
K∑
k=1
θkPsh˜
†
se,kh˜
T
se,k
)−1
h˜
†
sdh˜
T
sdXˆ
∗
1, (58)
which further implies that rank(Xˆ∗1) ≤ rank(h˜
†
sdh˜
T
sd) = 1. In addition, since the optimality of (P1.1-SDP) suggests
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that Xˆ∗1 6= 0, rank(Xˆ
∗
1) = 1 is thus proved.
As Xˆ∗1 can be decomposed as wˆ∗1wˆ∗H1 by EVD, (49a) results in Y 1wˆ∗1 = 0, which further implies that
wˆ∗1 = Ps
(
Ξ+
K∑
k=1
θkPsh˜
†
se,kh˜
T
se,k
)−1
h˜
†
sdh˜
T
sdwˆ
∗
1. (59)
Therefore, (59) admits a unique solution wˆ1 up to a scaling factor, which is given by
wˆ1 =
(
Ξ+
K∑
k=1
θkPsh˜
†
se,kh˜
T
se,k
)−1
h˜
†
sd. (60)
Consequently, we have wˆ∗1 = βwˆ1, where β ∈ R+. On the other hand, by plugging wˆ∗1 = βwˆ1 into the equality
constraint of (P1.1-SDP), we have β =
√
τ−ξ∗σ2nd−trace(Sˆ
∗
h
†
rdh
T
rd)
trace(wˆ1wˆ
H
1 Dsˆd)
, which yields
wˆ∗1 =
√√√√τ − ξ∗σ2nd − trace(Sˆ∗h†rdhTrd)
trace(wˆ1wˆ
H
1 Dsˆd)
wˆ1. (61)
At last, we show 3) of Proposition 4.1. For the case of K ≥ N , it is obvious that rank(Sˆ)∗ ≤ N . For the
case of K < N , only a sketch of the proof is provided here due to the length constraint. According to (48b),
first it is provable that λh†rdh
T
rd + U is a full-rank matrix when (P1.1-SDP) obtains its optimum value; next,
observing that rank(Y 2) ≥ N − rank(
∑K
k=1 θkh
†
re,kh
T
re,k), it follows that rank(Y 2) ≥ N − K as a result of
rank(
∑K
k=1 θkh
†
re,kh
T
re,k) ≤ K; then according to (49b), rank(Sˆ
∗
) ≤ K is thus obtained.
C. Proof of Proposition 4.2
First, use the following lemma to rewrite (P2′.1-SDR).
Lemma A.1: Problem (P2′.1-SDR) is equivalent to the following problem:
(P2′.1-SDR-Eqv) :

max
U1,U2,{xi},{yi}
(39)
s.t. (40), ∀k, (56), (57), ∀i,
trace(U1Ei) ≤ xi, trace(U 2Ei) ≥ yi, ∀i,
trace((U 1 −U2)Ei) ≤ 0, ∀i,
U1  0, U2  0,
where (56) and (57) are given at the top of next page.
Proof: For convenience of the proof, the optimum value for (P2′.1-SDR) and (P2′.1-SDR-Eqv) are denoted
by f∗0 and f˜∗0 , respectively. Assuming that (U∗1,U∗2, {x∗i }, {y∗i }) is the optimal solution to (P2′.1-SDR), it is
easily verified to be feasible for (P2′.1-SDR-Eqv) as well, which implies that f∗0 ≤ f˜∗0 . On the other hand,
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if (P2′.1-SDR-Eqv) returns an optimal solution of (U˜ ∗1, U˜
∗
2, {x˜∗i }, {y˜∗i }), by defining trace(U˜
∗
1Ei) = x
′∗
i and
trace(U˜
∗
2Ei) = y
′∗
i , ∀i, we show that (U˜
∗
1, U˜
∗
2, {x′∗i }, {y′∗i }) is also feasible for (P2′.1-SDR) as follows. As for
(35), ∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2σncy
′∗
i
2
√(
1− z¯ic0,i
)
1
c1,i(
1− z¯ic0,i − c1,ix′∗i
)
−
(
y′∗i +
1
c1,i
)
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(a)
≤
(
1− z¯i
c0,i
− c1,ix˜∗i
)
+
(
y˜∗i +
1
c1,i
)
(b)
≤
(
1− z¯ic0,i − c1,itrace(U˜
∗
1Ei)
)
+
(
trace(U˜
∗
2Ei) +
1
c1,i
)
=
(
1− z¯i
c0,i
− c1,ix′∗i
)
+
(
y′∗i +
1
c1,i
)
, (62)
where (a) is due to (56), and (b) comes from trace(U˜ ∗1Ei) ≤ x˜∗i and trace(U˜
∗
2Ei) ≥ y˜∗i . Similarly, (U˜
∗
1, U˜
∗
2, {x′∗i },
{y′∗i }) can be proved to satisfy (37) as well. In addition, x′∗i − y′∗i = trace(U˜
∗
1Ei) − trace(U˜
∗
2Ei) ≤ 0, ∀i, i.e.,
(38) holds true. These feasibility implies that f˜∗0 ≤ f∗0 . By combining the above two facts, we have f˜∗0 = f∗0 and
complete the proof.
Then, we apply the Charnes-Cooper transformation again to (P2′.1-SDR-Eqv), the result of which is denoted
by (P2′.1-SDP-Eqv), to study the property of Uˆ∗1 and Uˆ
∗
2. It is noteworthy that the Charnes-Cooper transformed
constraint of (56) admits the form given by ‖x(i)‖ ≤ h(xˆi, yˆi), ∀i, where x(i) is the column vector inside ‖ · ‖ of
the LHS of (56) and h(xˆi, yˆi) indicates the RHS expression. Since it is easily checked that ξ > 0 as a result of
feasibility, we have ‖x(i)‖ > 0⇒ h(xˆi, yˆi) > 0, which implies that[
h(xˆi, yˆi) x
(i)H
x(i) h(xˆi, yˆi)I
]
 0 (63)
according to Schur complement. It thus follows that (63) holds true, ∀x(i): ‖x(i)‖ ≤ h(xˆi, yˆi). As such, we can
show that (56) can be recast into a constraint without x, i.e., not related to Uˆ1, Uˆ2, following the same procedure
as [37, Appendix III] by exploiting [38, Lemma 2]. Similarly, the Charnes-Cooper transformed constraint of (57)
can also be rewritten without Uˆ 1, Uˆ2. Hence, the partial Lagrangian for (P2′.1-SDP-Eqv) in terms of Uˆ1 and Uˆ2
can be expressed as (64) (see top of next page), where ϕ denotes a tuple comprising all the associated primal and
dual variables: Y 1, Y 2, and {θk} are Lagrangian multipliers associated with Uˆ 1, Uˆ2, and (40), ∀k, respectively; λ
is the dual variable associated with the only equality constraint; ∆ = diag([δi]Ni=1) and Π = diag([pii]Ni=1) denote
those associated with trace(U1Ei) ≤ xi and trace(U2Ei) ≥ yi, ∀i, respectively; finally, the diagonal entry of
Σ = diag([σi]
N
i=1) denotes the dual variable associated with trace((U 1 − U2)Ei) ≤ 0, ∀i. The KKT conditions
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L(ϕ) = trace




Pss
†
sds
T
sd − λσ2nadiag(c0 ◦ ‖hrd‖.2)
+
∑K
k=1 θk
(
1
τ − 1
)
σ2nadiag(c0 ◦ ‖hre,k‖.2)
−Ps
∑K
k=1 θks
†
se,ks
T
se,k −∆−Σ+ Y 1

 Uˆ 1


+ trace




−λσ2ncdiag(c0 ◦ ‖hrd‖.2)
+
∑K
k=1 θk
(
1
τ − 1
)
σ2ncdiag(c0 ◦ ‖hre,k‖.2)
+Π+Σ+ Y 2

 Uˆ2

+ λτ, (64)
related to (64) are accordingly given by
Y 1 = −Pss†sdsTsd +Ξ′ + Ps
K∑
k=1
θks
†
se,ks
T
se,k (65a)
Y 2 =D −Π−Σ, (65b)
Y 1Uˆ
∗
1 = 0, (65c)
Y 2Uˆ
∗
2 = 0, (65d)
where we have introduced Ξ′ = σ
2
na
σ2nc
D+Σ+∆, and D = λσ2ncdiag(c0 ◦‖hrd‖.2)−
∑K
k=1 θk
(
1
τ − 1
)
σ2ncdiag(c0 ◦
‖hre,k‖.2) for notation simplicity. Next, we show that Ξ′+Ps
∑K
k=1 θks
†
se,ks
T
se,k in (65a) is a positive definite matrix
in the following two cases.
1) Case I: θk = 0, ∀k ∈ K. In this case, since λ > 0 (c.f. (64)) due to the strong duality, it is easily verified that
D ≻ 0 and therefore Ξ′ ≻ 0.
2) Case II: ∃k such that θk 6= 0. According to (65b), Y 2  0⇒ D  Π+Σ, which is a positive semidefinite
diagonal matrix. According to the similar argument made in Case III of Appendix B, it is thus shown that
Ξ
′ has maximum one zero diagonal entry and the positive definiteness of Ξ′ +Ps
∑K
k=1 θks
†
se,ks
T
se,k ≻ 0 can
be proved by definition without difficulty.
As Y 1 (c.f. (65a)) again complies with the difference between a positive definite matrix and a rank one matrix,
i.e., Pss†sdsTsd, it turns out that rank(Uˆ 1) ≤ 1 according to (65c). Then, following the same procedure as that in
Appendix B, 2) of Proposition 4.2 can be proved (details omitted for brevity).
Finally, it is verified that (P2′.1-SDP) is related to Uˆ∗2 merely with its diagonal entries, viz [Uˆ
∗
2]i,i, ∀i ∈ N ,
(c.f. (39), (40)). Furthermore, denoting [[Uˆ ∗2]1/2i,i ]Ni=1 by uˆ∗2, it is easily checked that the diagonal entries remain
the same after we replace Uˆ∗2 with uˆ∗2uˆ∗H2 . Combining the above two facts, we arrive at the conclusion that such
modification does not affect its optimality while returning a rank-one Uˆ∗2 for (P2′.1-SDP), which completes the
proof for 3).
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